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1 Abstract
Disclaimer: This paper is concerned with violent online harassment. To describe
the subject at an adequate level of realism, examples of our collected tweets involve
violent, threatening, vulgar and hateful speech language in the context of racial,
sexual, political, appearance and intellectual harassment. While these examples
are shared to portray reality, readers are alerted in advance and may wish to avoid
reading this material if it could cause discomfort and disagreeable response.
The presence of a significant amount of harassment in user-generated content
and its negative impact calls for robust automatic detection approaches. This
requires the identification of different types of harassment. Earlier work has
classified harassing language in terms of hurtfulness, abusiveness, sentiment, and
profanity. However, to identify and understand harassment more accurately, it is
essential to determine the contextual type that captures the interrelated conditions
in which harassing language occurs. In this paper
we introduce the notion of contextual type in harassment by distinguishing
between five contextual types: (i) sexual, (ii) racial, (iii) appearance-related, (iv)
intellectual and (v) political. We utilize an annotated corpus from Twitter distin-
guishing these types of harassment. We study the context of each kind to shed
light on the linguistic meaning, interpretation, and distribution, with results from
two lines of investigation: an extensive linguistic analysis, and the statistical dis-
tribution of uni-grams. We then build type- aware classifiers to automate the
identification of type-specific harassment. Our experiments demonstrate that these
classifiers provide competitive accuracy for identifying and analyzing harassment
on social media. We present extensive discussion and significant observations
about the effectiveness of type-aware classifiers using a detailed comparison setup,
providing insight into the role of type-dependent features.
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2 Introduction
Disclaimer: This paper is concerned with violent online harassment. To describe
the subject at an adequate level of realism, examples of our collected tweets involve
violent, threatening, vulgar and hateful speech language in the context of racial,
sexual, political, appearance and intellectual harassment. While these examples
are shared to portray reality, readers are alerted in advance and may wish to avoid
reading this material if it could cause discomfort and disagreeable response.
Although social media has enabled people to connect and interact with each
other, it has also made people vulnerable to insults, humiliation, hate, bullying–
facing threats from individuals who are either known (e.g., colleagues, friends) or
unknown (e.g., fans, clients, anonymous entities). A Pew research center report
[10] (e.g., offensive name-calling, and shaming, In this work, cyberbullying and
harassment are used interchangeably.). One-in-five (18%) victims characterized
their exposure as severe. The resulting negative impact from emotional distress,
privacy concerns and threats to physical safety and mental health, affect individuals
online and offline. This calls for tool-based, automatic detection, monitoring, and
analysis of hurtful language to protect online users. The prior state-of-the-art is
limited to detecting specific hurtful language such as hate speech [20], abusive
language [45], and profanity [35], collectively termed Negative Affective Language
(NAL). In the following, we present the definitions and terms for variants of
harassing language:
• Hate speech is “speech that denigrates a person because of their innate and
protected characteristics” [12]. Furthermore, it is divided into two categories:
directed and generalized, depending upon whether there is an explicit target
or not.
• Abusive Language is “the collection and misuse of private user informa-
tion, cyberbullying and the distribution of offensive, misleading, false or
malicious information” [54].
• Offensive Language employs profanity, is strongly impolite, rude or vulgar
red expressed with fighting or hurtful words to insult a targeted individual
or group [3, 8, 15, 61].
• Aggressive Language shows overt, angry and often violent social interac-
tion with the intention of inflicting damage or other unpleasantness upon
another individual or group of people [2, 22].
• Harassing (Cyberbullying) Language is the use of force, threat, or coer-
cion to abuse, embarrass, intimidate, or aggressively dominate others. It
typically denotes repeated and hostile behavior performed by a group or an
individual [2, 22, 23].
These definitions are highly subjective and overlap, making them hard to differ-
entiate. For example, the definition of harassing language is similar to aggressive
language. We posit that all of these NALs are hurtful and thus harassing. But
they might vary in their level of severity, presence or absence of target (victim),
contextual interpretation and purpose. In this paper, we frame harassing language
as offensive language where a given post/message contains “profanity, strongly
impolite, rude, vulgar or threatening language”.
Figure 1. Five contextual types of
harassment.
State-of-the-art harassment de-
tection fails to exploit the contex-
tual type of harassing language.
Webster’s dictionary [28] provides
the following definition for con-
text: “the parts of a discourse that
surround a word or passage and
can throw light on its meaning”.
Here, we describe the notion of
contextual type as the linguistic
or statistical conditions that help
in differentiating the type of ha-
rassment. For example, the circum-
stance of a student who has been
subjected to sexual harassment by
her ex-partner differs from a stu-
dent racially harassed because of
her/his color. We suggest that contextual type influences the linguistic character-
istics of harassment. We propose five contextual types of harassment in online
communication on social media: (i) sexual harassment, (ii) racial harassment,
(iii) appearance-related harassment, (iv) intellectual harassment, and (v) political
harassment. This categorization is represented in Fig. 1. Below, we define each
type of harassment using illustrative examples from the Twitter corpus we have
created.
1. Sexual harassment is offensive sexual speech that usually targets females.
E.g., the harasser might comment on the victim’s body in a vulgar manner or
mention sexual relationships in an aggressive way. Note that using sexually
profane words is not sufficient to indicate offensive sexual harassment
[6, 33].
2. Racial harassment targets race and ethnicity characteristics of a victim
such as skin color, country of origin, culture, or religion, in an offensive
manner [32].
3. Appearance-related harassment uses embarrassing language referring to
body appearance. Fat shaming [1] and body shaming are key subtypes of
this type of harassment.
4. Intellectual harassment offends the intellectual power or opinions of indi-
viduals. Even smart people may be ridiculed and become victims [7].
5. Political harassment is related to someone’s political views [24]. Typical
targets are politicians and politically inclined individuals who receive threat-
ening messages [29].
Determining the real intent behind a tweet regarding the type of harassment can
have serious implications for public perception. Consider the controversial tweet
from Roseanne Barr targeting Valerie Jarett: characterizing Jarrett, an African-
American woman born in Iran, as a child of the Muslim Brotherhood and an
ape [62]. Twitter Users regarded this tweet as racist, while Barr defended herself
as making a bad joke about Jarrett’s politics and looks. Thus, whether the tweet
is considered to be racist or regarded as appearance-related or political makes a
significant difference. Reliable assessment of the type of harassment can have sig-
nificant repercussions. We are unaware of any prior work on studying harassment
concerning these five types.
We summarize our contributions as follows: (i) We introduce five contextual
types of harassment. Then, we provide a systematic, and comparative analysis
to assess offensive language from linguistic and statistical perspectives for each
contextual type. This allows us to exploit relevant features for developing classifiers
to identify these critical types of harassment on social media. (ii) We develop type-
aware classifiers and capture their effectiveness using a detailed comparative study.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature.
We then present the type-aware corpus that we have developed. Subsequently, we
analyze our compiled corpus linguistically as well as statistically, which shows
us the significant type-specific features for various types of harassment. We then
discuss supervised learning approaches and classifiers for detecting the harassing
language in comparative settings. We also provide an error analysis study regarding
the pitfalls and challenges of our strategy. We close with the conclusions and our
future plans.
State-of-the-art in Harassment Research
The previous research studies targeted various social media sources such as Twitter,
Instagram, and Facebook. In Table 1, we summarize the prior literature with their
corresponding goals, conclusions, and underlying data sets. Here, we specifically
note particularly prominent related work. In [23], the authors seek to predict cyber-
bullying incidents on Instagram. They built a predictive model for the incidence of
cyberbullying using features from initially posted data, a social graph, and tempo-
ral properties. The work in [64] proposed an approach for detecting harassment
features based on the content, sentiment, and context. Using Slashdot and MySpace
data, they showed significant improvement using TFIDF supplemented with senti-
ment and contextual features. The authors of [50] proposed an approach to spotting
harassers as well as victims on social media. They considered the social structure
and infer which user is a likely instigator and which user is expected to be a victim.
This model is based on social interactions and the language of users in social
media. Similarly, [49] proposes a method that simultaneously discovers instigators
and victims of bullying incidents. It extends an initial bullying vocabulary using
twitter and ask.fm. In [48], the authors proposed a supervised learning method for
detecting cyberbullying in Japan. In [44], the authors propose a supervised learning
method based on fuzzy logic and genetic algorithm to identify the presence of
cyberbullying terms and classify activities, such as flaming, harassment, racism,
and terrorism on social media. Fuzzy rules were used to classify data, and a genetic
algorithm was used for optimizing the parameters.
[61] explores the correlation of behaviors and actions of people and their
emotions. The authors developed a large emotion-labeled dataset of harassing
tweets. They applied 131 emotion hashtag keywords categorized into seven groups
and collected 5 million tweets. To find useful features for emotion identification,
they applied LIBLINEAR [14] andMultinomial Naive Bayes [41] algorithms. They
extracted n-gram features [55] to analyze the emotion, and they applied Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) to expand the feature set with related emotional
words. Interestingly, the authors of [22] target cyber-aggression and cyberbullying
in a multi-modal context with text comments and media objects on Instagram.
They concluded that non-text features are not able to substantially improve the
performance of cyberbullying detection compared to text-based features.
Different from the previous work, some literature examines the psychological
implications of harassment incidents [51]. The authors in [36] sought the reasons
behind the updates of posts on Facebook. They noticed that: (i) the majority
of posts are about social activities and everyday life, (ii) people with low self-
esteem updated their status on relationship whereas those with high self-esteem
update their status with respect to their children. Moreover, people with narcissistic
personality disorder updated their status through their achievements. Furthermore,
they observed a correlation between the number of likes and comments with esteem
level of people (e.g., the people with the low self-esteem receive fewer likes and
comments because their status expresses greater negative affect). Similarly, the
authors of [65] discuss narcissism personality disorder in Facebook users and
its implications in harassing incidents. Our own past work [11, 31] focused on
(i) using a conversation between a sender and a receiver to better capture its
normal linguistic nature (e.g., base rates for curse word usage) and the nature of
the relationship between participants (e.g., friends vs. strangers), and (ii) analyze
comments/review threads to better identify offensive content in non-text media
such as YouTube videos [31], to reliably detect harassment between participants.
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Type-aware Harassment Corpus
We published a type-aware annotated corpus and lexicon in [17]. Our corpus
consists of 25,000 annotated tweets for the five types of harassment content and is
available on the Git repository [42]. In the following, we discuss our strategies for
corpus compilation and annotation. The identification of cyberbullying typically
begins with a lexicon of potentially profane or offensive words. We created a
lexicon (compiled from online resources [26] [60] [25] [56] [57]) containing
offensive words covering five different types of harassment context. The resulting
compiled lexicon includes six categories: (i) sexual, (ii) racial, (iii) appearance-
related, (iv) intellectual, (v) political, and (vi) a generic category that contains
profane words not exclusively attributed to the five specific types of harassment.
A native English speaker conducted this categorization.
Corpus Development and Annotation. We employ Twitter as the social media
data source because of its extensive public footprint. Twitter reports 313 million
monthly active users that generate over 500 million tweets per day [58]. Although
the size of a tweet is restricted (140 characters at the time of corpus collection),
once we consider a more extensive aggregation of tweets on a specific topic,
mining approaches reveal valuable insights. We utilized the first five categories of
our lexicon as seed terms for collecting tweets from Twitter between December
18th, 2016 to January 10th 2017 [58] (This date was close to the US presidential
election. Then our political sub-corpus has many tweets with the subject of Trump).
Requiring the presence of at least one lexicon item, we collected 10,000 tweets for
each contextual type for a total of 50,000 tweets. As shown in Table 2, nearly half
of these tweets were annotated. However, the mere presence of a lexicon item in
a tweet does not assure that the tweet is harassing because the individuals might
utilize these words with a different intention, e.g., in a friendly manner or as a quote.
Therefore, human judges annotated the corpus to discriminate harassing tweets
from non-harassing tweets. Three native English speaking annotators determined
whether or not a given tweet was harassing with respect to the type of harassment
content and assigned one of three labels yes, no, and other. The last label indicates
that the given tweet either does not belong to the current context or cannot be
decided. Ultimately, we acquired ≈24,000 annotated tweets represented in Table
2. Note that the annotation task was done on a per tweet basis although it can be
improved using the entire conversation history.
Contextual Type Annotated Tweets Harassing 3 Non-Harassing 7
Sexual 3,855 230 3,619
Racial 4,976 701 4,275
Appearance-related 4,828 678 4,150
Intellectual 4,867 811 4,056
Political 5,663 699 4,964
Combined 24,189 3,119 21,070
Table 2. Annotation statistics of our categorized corpus.
Agreement Rate. Although the annotators employed three labels, i.e., yes, no,
and other, the eventual corpus excluded all tweets without a consensus label of
“yes” or “no”. That is, the corpus contains only those tweets that received at least
two “yes” or two “no” labels. Cohen’s kappa coefficient [53] measures the quality
of annotation by category in Table 3. The appearance-related context shows the
highest agreement rate whereas political and sexual contexts have the lowest,
indicating that they are more challenging to judge due to higher ambiguity.
Content Type Agreement Rate
Sexual 0.70
Racial 0.84
Appearance-related 1.00
Intellectual 0.80
Political 0.69
Table 3. Agreement rate.
Annotating Golbeck Corpus. The public state-of-the-art harassment-related
corpus is the Golbeck corpus [17] that only provides generic annotation, i.e., (i)
harassing and (ii) non-harassing. This corpus contains 20,428 non-redundant
annotated tweets of which only 5,277 are labeled as harassing. Since we require
context-aware annotations, we re-annotated the harassing tweets of Golbeck. The
agreement rate (Cohen’s kappa) between the two annotators is 86%. As shown in
Table 4, more than 75% of the harassing tweets are racial. This statistic confirms
Golbeck’s observation. While this may be an accurate reflection of the base rate,
our view is that different harassment contexts may have different consequence.
An imbalanced corpus at the foundation of our research effort could result in
misses of particular practical import to teenage mental health, concerning sexuality,
appearance and intellect.
Contextual Type #of Tweets
Sexual 380
Racial 4148
Appearance-related 145
Intellectual 381
Political 163
Non Harassing 41
Total 5277
Table 4. Statistics for the Golbeck corpus after our annotation wrt.
contextual type.
LIWC Analysis for Different Types of Harassment
Linguistic analysis of our corpus sheds light on the differences between the ha-
rassing corpus versus non-harassing corpus for each type. Furthermore, it provides
a comparison between various types of harassment. We divided our corpus into
12 sub-corpora: (i) one generic corpus containing all harassing tweets regardless
of their type, called the combined harassing corpus, (ii) one generic corpus
containing all non-harassing tweets irrespective of the type called the combined
non-harassing corpus, (iii) five contextual type-aware corpora including only
harassing tweets per type, (iv) five contextual type-aware corpora including only
non-harassing tweets per type. For linguistic analysis, we utilized LIWC [27] [46].
This tool tallies 96 linguistic features using a multiword lexicon for each feature.
We individually analyzed each of the 12 sub-corpora using LIWC. An effect size
, statistic estimates the magnitude of an effect (e.g., mean difference, regression
coefficient, Cohen’s d, and correlation coefficient) [5] metric was used to deter-
mine significant discriminators [43]. Conventionally, a proportion (feature) fi is
considered moderately discriminating when its effect size is more than 0.5 (i.e.,
|efi | > 0.5), and is considered unhelpful if |efi | ≈ 0. The effect size for each
feature is calculated as follows:
efi =
experimentalgroup− controlgroup
std
(1)
where, experimentalgroup is the mean of the experimental group on the
given feature fi, controlgroup is the mean of the control group wrt. the given
feature fi and std is the standard deviation. For each content corpus as well as
for the combined corpus, we consider the harassing corpus as the experimental
group and the non-harassing corpus as the control group. We compared the preva-
lence of the 96 LIWC features in the harassing corpus to their prevalence in the
corresponding non-harassing corpus. Out of the 96 original features, we removed
features that were not significant in any of the contextual types and retained 38
of the most discriminating features as shown in Fig. 2. The extreme red (green)
color represents significance (regarding effect size) of the corresponding feature
in the harassing (non-harassing) corpus. In the following, we highlight specific
significant features to make three points. First, a feature is often diagnostic of the
non-harassing corpus. Second, feature significance is type dependent. The third is
related to both points: a given feature, such as “you”, can be a positive indication
of harassment for one type and a negative indication of harassment for another.
In the following, we indicate highly significant linguistic features derived from
Fig. 2 for each individual type. Note that our corpus is already biased towards
curse words because curse words are present as seeds for crawling. Thus, our
observations on discriminatory features are conditional on a “high recall curse
word-laden corpus”.
Sexual Corpus The pronoun “I” is prevalent in the sexually non-harassing
corpus with e = −1.2, which is highly significant, e.g., i’m le***an kiss.
Furthermore, the feature “MONEY” is prevalent in the harassing corpus with
e = 2.9. E.g., send free moneyb**ch hoe wont give dance hoe
a*s industry bitch d*cks*** p*r* star people.
Racial Corpus The pronoun “YOU” is prevalent in the harassing corpus with
e = 0.9, e.g., Vishalp sikanda, Quideazam hahahaha u p**i can
block u cant debat u p**i I***an. The “COMPARATIVE” fea-
ture is prevalent in racial non-harassing corpus with e = −0.84, e.g., save
block p**i like po yung comment ni richard fronda (the word
‘like’ is an indicator of comparison in LIWC). Thus, these features can be used to
discriminate between harassing and non-harassing tweets.
Political Corpus The pronoun “SHE” and “HE” with e = −0.9 and the pro-
noun “WE” with e = −0.8 are prevalent in the non-harassing corpus, e.g.,
realdonaldtrump putin a**hat just like word can express
displeasure leader god help us (us indicates the pronoun ‘WE’).
The “RISK” feature is significant in non-harassing with e = −1.9 , e.g., f***
wrong democratic senators. The word ‘wrong’ represents a risk fea-
ture in LIWC dictionary. Other sample risk related words are ‘danger’, ‘doubt’,
etc. Furthermore, the “ANXIETY” feature with e = −0.92 is significant in
the non-harassing corpus. E.g., well i’m true dumb f*** democrat
wouldn’t doubt.
Appearance-related Corpus “NEGATION” with e = 2.3 is prevalent in
the harassing corpus (probably because of the negative language used for re-
Appearance Inttellectual Political Racial Sexual Combined
I 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.21 0.00
We 0.07 0.29 -0.89 -0.06 0.00 0.19
You 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.93 0.00 -0.80
She/he -0.16 -0.38 -0.98 -0.49 0.00 0.54
They -0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00
Ipron -0.54 -0.59 0.13 0.30 -0.12 0.17
Conj -0.90 0.58 0.45 0.06 0.16 -0.06
Negation 2.34 0.17 0.24 -0.31 0.00 -0.16
Comparison 0.63 0.00 0.15 -0.85 0.55 -0.07
Interrogtives -0.98 -0.56 -0.27 -0.06 0.22 0.48
Number -0.57 0.00 0.45 0.22 1.35 -0.08
Quantifier -0.94 0.07 -0.23 0.48 0.53 -0.08
Anxeity -0.37 0.21 -0.93 -0.15 0.35 0.31
Sad -0.81 0.28 -0.57 0.02 0.69 0.19
Family 0.00 0.60 1.84 0.24 0.34 -0.34
Friend 0.70 0.59 0.00 0.23 1.97 -1.00
Female 0.00 2.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Insight 0.76 0.41 0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.29
Cause 0.00 0.00 -2.38 0.75 0.00 0.00
Discrep 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.52 0.00 -1.52
Tentat -1.11 -0.18 -1.00 -1.50 0.60 0.66
Certain -0.96 -1.03 -0.44 -0.09 0.82 0.45
Differ -1.01 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
See 0.03 -0.16 -0.51 -0.30 -0.36 0.24
Hear -1.58 0.30 -0.90 -2.06 0.86 0.00
Feel -0.66 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.58 1.24
Health 0.00 1.23 -0.13 -0.47 -0.19 0.42
Ingest 0.00 1.51 1.38 0.81 -0.52 0.00
Risk -0.91 -1.37 -1.99 -0.13 0.36 0.81
Past 2.52 -0.02 -0.09 -0.37 0.00 -0.03
Future 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.57 0.00 0.40
Motion 0.53 -0.02 0.09 -0.19 0.07 -0.06
Home -0.71 0.13 0.93 -0.21 0.73 -0.09
Money 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 2.96 0.56
Religion 0.32 -0.10 0.21 0.00 0.60 0.32
Assent -0.85 0.07 0.43 0.03 -0.12 0.05
Nonflu -0.66 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.06
Filler -0.94 -0.12 1.12 0.32 0.00 0.22
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Figure 2. Significant LIWC features in comparing harassing corpus to
non-harassing corpus for six categories. The extreme red (green) color indicates
the significance of a given feature in the harassing corpus (non-harassing corpus).
E.g. the negation feature with the value 2.34 in the appearance harassing corpus is
significantly higher than non-harassing corpus. The white color indicates a lack of
difference for a given feature when comparing two corpora.
ferring to the body and appearance-related subjects). E.g., Taylor swift
cant shake c**el toe. The other significant feature in the harassing cor-
pus is the ‘‘PAST TENSE”. E.g., Ugli a** didn’t go run yesterday
get work f*t**s. Furthermore, the “COMPARATIVE” feature is prevalent
in appearance-related harassing corpus with e = 0.63. E.g., hey lardass
notice your look pizza perhaps like f*** salad a**hole.
The word ‘like’ indicates a comparative feature.
Intellectual Corpus The “FEMALE REFERENCE” feature with e = 2.3
is highly significant in intellectual harassing corpus (perhaps because girls are
harassed more wrt. intellectual issues.) E.g., She is dumb f***.
Combined Corpus “DISCREPANCY” with e = −1.5 is prevalent in the non-
harassing corpus e.g., boss brought drunken sugar cook explain
there alcohol just sh**face.
Statistical Analysis of Different Types
We investigate the relationship between the offensive words employed in collecting
our corpora and the specific lexical items in the crawled corpora. We determineQ1:
whether or not offensive words are observed as frequent words,Q2: whether or not
the frequent words in harassing corpora differ from those in non-harassing corpora,
and Q3: whether or not frequent words are type-sensitive, in other words, whether
the frequent words vary with type of context. Fig. 3 shows the 2D visualization
of the word embeddings of the top-25 most frequent words for the harassing
corpora, whereas Fig. 4 represents a similar display for the top-25 most frequent
words for the non-harassing corpora (the following section presents the details of
word embedding). The prevalence of curse words in the non-harassing corpora
is comparable to the harassing corpora. This confirms that the presence of curse
words is not a sufficient indicator of harassment. In the following, we mention our
key observations.
Key Observations. Regarding Q1, as expected, we observed that offensive
words are commonplace in both harassing and non-harassing corpora across types
(cf. Fig. 3 and 4). In addition, we observed some emerging, frequent offensive
words, such as “grab” and “camel”that can now be added to our initial offensive
lexicon [42]. Furthermore, there are frequent words that are not necessarily offen-
sive. E.g., consider “look” or “eat” in the appearance-related type where they are
implicitly related to the associated type, applicable to the appearance of a subject.
Regarding Q2, we observe that the frequent words in the harassing corpora are
different from those in the non-harassing corpora. The particular words in the
harassing corpora also can be added to the initial lexicon of seed words. The result
of this analysis can be utilized for weighting the severity of offensiveness for every
single word included in our lexicon.
To reply quantitatively to Q3, we ran an annotation task on the top-15 most
frequent words for each type of harassing corpus as well as the corresponding
non-harassing corpus. The description of this task is as follows: we asked the
human annotators (i.e., graduate students) to determine whether or not a given
frequent word is related to the associated type either explicitly or implicitly. E.g.,
the words “eat” or “food” are implicitly related to appearance while they seem far
from the type racial. The results of this exercise appear in Table 5. In the harassing
corpora, the percentage of relatedness of words to the associated type is higher
than 67% and in sexual and racial types, it even reaches 80%. This percentage
fluctuates for non-harassing corpora. E.g., in appearance-related type, it is higher
than 93% while in racial it reaches 53%. In sum, we conclude that the frequent
words are mostly type-sensitive. Moreover, the prevalence of apparently offensive
language in the non-harassing corpus reinforces our claim that offensive language
per se is not necessarily harassing.
Category Type Percentage
Appearance-related H 66.6%NH 93.3%
Intellectual H 73.3%NH 73.3%
Political H 80%NH 73.3%
Racial H 80%NH 53.3%
Sexual H 80%NH 60%
Table 5. Percentage of type-dependent of top-15 frequent words within each
sub-corpus. H stands for the harassing corpus and NH stands for the
non-harassing corpus.
One caveat is that the most frequent words appearing in the sub-corpus as-
sociated with each type are predominantly stop-words or curse words, as our
initial seed terms are biased to an offensive lexicon. Ignoring these words, whose
presence cuts across different types of harassment, revealed that the following
prominent word groups are associated with various harassment types, shedding
light on the possible features that may elicit harassment: (i) In the appearance-
related harassment corpus, target words such as “eat”, “ugly”, “fat”, “gym”, and
“weight”, are present. (ii) In the intellectual harassment corpus, target words such as
“dumb”, “stupid”, “work”, and “head”, are present. (iii) In the political harassment
corpus, the target words such as “realdonaldtrump”, “libtard”, “dumb”, “touch
bag”, “stupid”, and “cnn”, are present. (iv) In the racial harassment corpus, target
words such as “m*ki”, “n**ger”, “b**ner”, “ch**k”, “muslim”, “i**ian”, “moron”,
and “jew”, are present. (iv) In the sexual harassment corpus, target words such as
“hump”, “hussy”, “l**k”, and “grab”, are present.
Predicting Different Types of Harassing Posts
We aim to develop effective supervised learning methods to detect harassing
language automatically and distinguish it from non-harassing language for each
contextual type. The state-of-the-art contains various approaches for detecting
harassing content from non-harassing content but not for discriminating the type
of harassment. We approach this gap in two ways. The first is to build individual
binary classifiers that identify a particular type of harassment, e.g., a binary
classifier that identifies only racial content or a binary classifier that classifies
just offensive political content. The second approach uses the state-of-the-art
methods to detect harassing language; after such recognition, we can employ a
type-aware classifier to predict the associated type for that harassment incident.
We implemented both approaches. Initially, we trained the individual classifiers for
each type. In another approach, we built up a binary classifier that differentiates
harassing content from non-harassing content regardless of their type. Note that
any classifier from the state-of-the-art can substitute for this part. Then, we built
up a multi-class classifier that predicts the type of harassment incident. The results
of our experiments for both approaches reveal high accuracy. Furthermore, to
verify the effectiveness of our classifier, we apply transfer learning by running our
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Figure 3. Top-25 frequent words within each harassing corpora.
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Figure 4. Top-25 frequent words within each non-harassing corpora
classifier on the Golbeck corpus and assess its performance for how successfully
it predicts the type of harassment. In the following, we present the details of our
experiments.
Transforming Tweets to Vectors
We utilized four approaches for transforming tweets to numerical representations
(i.e., vectors): (i) the conventional vectorization approach TFIDF, (ii) word2vec,
(iii) fastText and (iv) a LIWC vector. We feed our classifiers with each of these
individual vectors or a combination of them.
The Term Frequency and Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF). We use
this approach [63] to transform each given tweet into a weighted vector T.
Distributional semantics (i.e., word2vec and fastText). Distributional seman-
tics (so-called embedding models) [40] play a vital role in many Natural Language
Processing (NLP) applications. They capture the semantics of text units (e.g.,
words, characters, tweets, paragraphs or documents) from the underlying corpus
and represent them in a low dimensional vector space. We use two major embed-
ding models for representing each tweet. The first one is word2vec [19] and the
second one is fastText [13] [39]. The first one learns a dense representation at
the unigram level and the second one learns at the character level. Both of these
approaches have two models, i.e., skip-gram model and CBOW model [38, 40]
that are roughly similar. The skip-gram model (CBOW model) computes the prob-
ability of the target word wk (i.e. context word) appearing in the neighborhood of
the context word wi (i.e. target word), P(wk|wi). In this work, the vector repre-
sentation of a tweet is computed as the concatenation of the vector of all tokens
within the tweet. In the rest of this paper we rely on the following notations to
specify a vector. W(S) and W(C) denote the low dimensional vector obtained
respectively by the skip-gram model and CBOW model of the word2vec approach.
F(S) and F(C) denote the low dimensional vector obtained respectively by the
skip-gram model and the CBOW model of the fastText approach. We compiled a
corpus containing 15,999,557 sentences from the Twitter and Leipzig Collection
Corpora [18] leveraging our offensive lexicon presented in [52] as the underlying
seed words. Then, we trained the embedding models on this accumulated corpus
using the learning parameters reported in [38, 40]. Our dimension size equals 300,
the window size is 3, and the minimum count equals 10.
LIWC Vector. The vector obtained by running the LIWC tool is denoted by L.
Evaluation of the Harassment Classifiers
Preparing training datasets. As the number of harassing tweets is not equal
to the number of non-harassing ones in our corpus – in fact, it varies for each
type – we prepared balanced datasets for training the classifier. We prepared five
type-aware training data sets using an under-sampling approach taking all of the
harassing tweets with an equal number of non-harassing (randomly sampled). Also,
we prepared a combined training data set considering all of the harassing tweets
regardless of their type and an equal number of non-harassing tweets. Table 6
shows the size of the training data sets for each type. Each data set contains an
equal number of harassing tweets versus non-harassing tweets. Later, we employ
the remaining tweets to test the robustness of the classifiers against unseen data.
Category Number of tweets
Appearance-related 1,344
Intellectual 1,622
Political 1,397
Racial 1,401
Sexual 461
Combined 6,225
Table 6. Size of the training datasets for each type.
Training Binary Classifiers. In our experimental study, we trained four types of
classifiers, using (i) Support Vector Machine (SVM) [34], (ii) K-Nearest Neighbors
(KNN) [34], (iii) Gradient Boosting Machine (GBM) [16], and (iv) Naive Bayes
(NB) [34]. We rely on the following settings for the GBM classifier: the learning
rate is 0.1, loss function is logistic regression, the number of trees is 100, sub-
sample is 1.0, the criteria function is Friedman MSE, the minimum sample is 2, the
minimum number of samples required to be at a leaf node is 1, and the maximum
depth of the individual regression estimators is 3. We ran 10-fold cross-validation
with re-sampling and iteration strategies (repeated five times). Figure 5 shows the
performance of the classifiers based on an F-score measure using a TFIDF vector.
Generally, the results of the NB classifier in all of the cases were inferior whereas
the GBM classifier outperforms others in the majority of settings except for a few
instances comparable to the SVM classifier. Thus, in the following experiments,
we rely on the GBM classifier.
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Figure 5. Comparative Study of the F-score from four major classifiers i.e., SVM
stands for Support Vector Machine, KNN= K-Nearest Neighbor, GBM= Gradient
Boosting Machine, NB= Naive Bayes, NN= Nueral Network)
Feature Engineering. To gain insight over the effectiveness of various features,
we feed the GBM classifier with various feature settings. The fine-grained results
of our experiment are listed in Figure 6. We employed a various combination of
vectors, for example, F(S)+W(S) means the input features were the skip-gram
models of fastText and word2vec. In addition to the typical precision, recall and
F-score measures, we provide specificity (True negative rates) and accuracy rates.
We offer the following observations: (i) The tweet representation using F(S)+W(S)
vector is the most effective input representation as it provides high and balanced
rates for all measures including precision, recall, F-score and specificity. Note
that in multiple settings such as F(S)+L+T, precision, recall, and f-score are high
whereas specificity is low meaning that the classifier is biased towards one of the
classes and does not perform reasonably on both classes. (ii) In the settings for
which the LIWC vector L is included, typically the specificity rate is low. This
probably means L vector does not provide a discriminative representation for the
classifier. (iii) Generally learning the representation of tweets using the fastText
approach either with skip-gram or CBOW shows high performance. This might
come from the fact that encoding tweets at the character level is more effective
for detecting harassment. (iv) The sexual type resulted in the classifier with the
highest accuracy (with F-score 96% and specificity 94%), racial and intellectual
are in the next positions (respectively with F-score 88%, 86% and specificity 83%,
79%).
Binary Classifier for Harassment Detection. We also trained a binary classi-
fier on our combined corpus where it can differentiate the harassing language
from non-harassing regardless of the contextual type. In situations that the type of
harassment does not play a role, or type detection must occur after the harassment
detection, using such a generic classifier is necessary. Table 7 shows the detailed
results of this classifier in various settings of input features. Generally, the vector
of FastText F shows an effective role, especially when it is coupled with the W
vector; the specificity score reaches its optimum.
Feature Precision Recall F-Score Accuracy Specificity
T 0.84 0.81 0.82
T+L 0.9 0.87 0.88
F(S)+L+T 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.37
F(C)+L+T 0.94 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.44
F(S) 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.75
F(C) 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.73
F(S)+L 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.69
W(S)+L+T 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.70
W(S)+L 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.74
F(S)+W(S) 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.83
Table 7. Performance of the GBM binary classifier on the combined corpus.
Type Prediction using a Multi-Class Classifier. Apart from building binary
classifiers for predicting types, we trained a multi-class classifier to predict the
type of harassment incidents. We trained several multi-class classifiers, among
them the GBM classifier outperformed others. Herein we report the result for GBM
classifier only. We used W(S)+F(S) vectorization approach as the input feature.
Then, we trained this classifier on a corpus containing all of the sub-corpora
from the previous step. This corpus has samples with six various labels where
five labels indicate a particular type of harassment and the last label indicates
“non-harassing” implying there is no harassing language. Table 8 shows the details
of the evaluation on the performance of this classifier where the micro F-score
is 0.92 and the macro F-score is 0.82. Note that in the macro-level, we calculate
the performances of each class and then average whereas, in the micro-level,
we calculate the performance for all classes, as computing contingency table
and then evaluate precision/recall and F-score [30]. Digging into fine-grained
efficiency shows that the accuracy across various classes holds similar behaviors
except for a decrease in the precision and recall of the sexual type. As we will
discuss in error analysis below, this type is prone to mis-classification with the
other types particularly the racial type. However, comparing the performance of
multi-class classifier and binary classifiers shows that the multi-class classifier
mostly outperforms the binary classifiers by as much as ≈ 10%. Note that the
accuracy of our classifier will improve on a generic tweet corpus because our
current corpus has been crawled using curse words with a significantly higher
proportion of harassing tweets compared to that in a generic tweets corpus, which
is predominantly non-harassing and devoid of curse words. On the downside, it
will miss harassment conveyed through “clean” words. However, to demonstrate
Feature Precision Recall F-Score Accuracy Specificity
T 0.85 0.89 0.86
T+L 0.89 0.92 0.9
F(S)+L+T 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.28
F(C)t+L+T 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.19
F(S) 0.80 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.74
F(C) 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.73 0.70
F(S)+L 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.28
W(S)+L+T 0.94 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.30
W(S)+L 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.28
F(S)+W(S) 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.74
T 0.92 0.86 0.88
T+L 0.94 0.89 0.91
F(S)+L+T 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.35
F(C)+L+T 0.91 0.89 0.85 0.82 0.37
F(S) 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.74
F(C) 0.79 0.84 0.81 0.79 0.73
F(S)+L 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.76
W(S)+L+T 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.72
W(S)+L 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.70
F(S)+W(S) 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.79
T 0.91 0.9 0.9
T+L 0.94 0.94 0.94
F(S)+L+T 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.52
F(C)+L+T 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.41
F(S) 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.75
F(C) 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.66
F(S)+L 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.47
W(S)+L+T 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.49
W(S)+L 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.48
F(S)+W(S) 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.73
T 0.77 0.69 0.72
T+L 0.87 0.84 0.84
F(S)+L+T 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.43
F(C)+L+T 0.94 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.41
F(S) 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.83
F(C) 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.72
F(S)+L 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.72
W(S)+L+T 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.53
W(S)+L 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.51
F(S)+W(S) 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.83
T 0.95 0.91 0.93
T+L 0.97 0.95 0.96
F(S)+L+T 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.53
F(C)+L+T 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.56
F(S) 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.78 0.67
F(C) 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.61
F(S)+L 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.71
W(S)+L+T 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.59
W(S)+L 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.82
F(S)+W(S) 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94
Apperance
Racial
Sexual
Political
Intellectual
Figure 6. Comparative Study of the various feature settings on the performance of
the GBM classifier using measures such as precision, recall, F-score, accuracy,
and specificity. The extreme colors, i.e., purple, yellow, green, olive, and pink
show the higher values versus the white color that shows a lower value.
the effectiveness of the current version of this classifier, in the next step we apply
it on an unseen corpus to predict the type of harassment incident.
Category Precision Recall F-score
Appearance-related 0.84 0.85 0.84
Intellectual 0.87 0.85 0.86
Political 0.81 0.84 0.83
Racial 0.82 0.83 0.82
Sexual 0.58 0.62 0.60
Nonharassing 0.98 0.97 0.98
Micro Precision 0.92 Macro Precision 0.82
Micro Recall 0.92 Macro Recall 0.83
Micro F-score 0.92 Macro F-score 0.82
Table 8. Performance of our multi-class classifier for predicting type of
harassment incident.
Comparison to the state-of-the-art. Since this work was the first to introduce
contextual type for harassment, comparison to the state-of-the-art that relies only on
two or three variants of harassment, is unfair. However, to verify the effectiveness
of our type-oriented multi-class classifier, we tested it on the harassing tweets
from the Golbeck corpus (an external corpus unseen to our classifier) that is a
publicly available state-of-the-art harassment-related corpus [61]. This corpus
contains 20,428 annotated tweets of which only 5,277 are labeled as harassing. It
does not distinguish the nature of the harassment. In Table 4, we represented our
annotations for the harassing tweets of the Golbeck corpus with respect to our types
using human judges which yielded in an agreement rate of 86%. The proportion
of harassing tweets per type is represented in the last column of Table 9. We ran
our type-aware multi-class classifier (GMB classifier) to predict the associated
type of harassing tweets on Golbeck corpus. Table 9 shows the precision, recall
and F-score for each type. We observe an F-score of more than 94% for all types
except for the type appearance. In the case of the racial type, the F-score reaches
98%. This high performance exceeds the state-of-the-art where they are mostly
concerned about detecting the general harassing language (the reported accuracy
ranges between 70% and 85%) [21, 37, 51, 66]. In addition, it shows robustness
with unseen data. Note that the racial type is dominant in the Golbeck corpus. We
also ran our classifier on a portion of 5,000 non-harassing tweets from Golbeck
corpus, which resulted in the F-score > 98% (cf. Table 9). The last three rows of
Table 9 show micro and macro precision, recall, and F-score. The closeness of
the micro and macro measures shows that the classifier is not biased towards a
dominant class.
Category Precision Recall F-score Proportion Rate
Appearance-related 0.74 0.63 0.68 2.7%
Intellectual 0.91 0.92 0.91 7.2%
Political 0.90 0.95 0.92 3.0%
Racial 0.99 0.97 0.98 78.6%
Sexual 0.94 0.96 0.95 7.2%
Nonharassing 0.99 0.98 0.98
Micro Precision 0.97 Macro Precision 0.91
Micro Recall 0.97 Macro Recall 0.90
Micro F-score 0.97 Macro F-score 0.91
Table 9. Performance of our classifier for predicting tweets for Golbeck
corpus.
Error Analysis. To make sense of classifier errors, we examined a couple of
tweets classified as sexual. E.g., for @usr you deserved to be raped
by a thousand Muslims in your c**t a**hole , our classifier clas-
sified that as sexual harassment and not racial because of the word ‘rape’. Similarly,
the tweet @usr @usr lol it’s not against women. It’s against
f***ing feminist c***s like you. #feminazi #womenagainstfeminism
was classified as sexual. Such cases are ambiguous because even manual anno-
tation is highly subjective. In other words, categorizing harassment is highly
subjective and the boundary between types is not rigid. In majority of the over-
lapping cases (racial and sexual), the tweets were classified as sexual rather than
racial. We also analyzed errors in political tweets and concluded that harassment
signal can be: (i) implicit, e.g., John Boehner blames Democrats for
#shutdown. He better stop drinking cuz a few more drinks
and he starts blaming the J*ws f, (ii) ambiguous ??? You’re
a wh*** to the telecom industry, i hope your constituents
vote you out., (iii) unreliable, e.g., It’s going to be a republican
government in the US next term. Democrats can kiss their
presidency bid goodbye. Let the J*ws rule!, (iv) poorly cap-
tured through annotation, e.g., the tweet @TrueNugget @FeministPeriod
@OregonState Man college is becoming more and more a mistake.
in the Golbeck corpus. Our classifier misses them as they are weak cases of ha-
rassment.
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Conclusion and Future Plans
In this paper, we introduced five contextual types for harassment, namely, (i) sexual,
(ii) racial, (iii) intellectual, (iv) appearance-related and (v) political. We presented
experiments with a type-aware tweets corpus to analyze, learn, and understand
harassing language for each type. Our contribution lies in providing a systematic
and comparative approach to assessing harassing language from linguistic and
statistical perspectives. Furthermore, we built type-specific classifiers, and the
results of our experiments show the importance of considering the contextual type
for identifying and analyzing harassment on social media.
In general, a single tweet identified as “harassing” may not provoke the same
intense negative feeling that we associate with that word in the real-world scenario.
However, in practice, “conversational” exchanges containing a sequence of such
tweets can rise to the level of harassment causing mental and psychological anguish,
and fear of physical harm. Nevertheless, our current Twitter dataset is limited to
annotating single tweets in isolation for harassment. Furthermore, the reliable
assessment of the type of harassment is a difficult problem because it requires
significant knowledge of current events and common-sense. We plan to extend this
work by learning the language of harassers as well as victims, and further study
the contribution of non-verbal cues (i.e., conversational features, network features,
and community features) for identifying online harassment activities, particularly
on social media.
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